Pollution, Public Health Care, and Life Expectancy When Inequality Matters by Schaefer, A. & Prskawetz, A.
Pollution, Public Health Care, and 
Life Expectancy When Inequality 
Matters
Schaefer, A. and Prskawetz, A.
IIASA Interim Report
October 2013
 
Schaefer, A. and Prskawetz, A. (2013) Pollution, Public Health Care, and Life Expectancy When Inequality Matters. IIASA 
Interim Report. IR-13-015 Copyright © 2013 by the author(s). http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/10745/ 
Interim Report on work of the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis receive only limited review. Views or 
opinions expressed herein do not necessarily represent those of the Institute, its National Member Organizations, or other 
organizations supporting the work. All rights reserved. Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work 
for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial 
advantage. All copies must bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. For other purposes, to republish, to post on 
servers or to redistribute to lists, permission must be sought by contacting repository@iiasa.ac.at 
 International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis  
Registration number: ZVR 524808900 
 
 
International Institute for 
Applied Systems Analysis 
Schlossplatz 1 
A-2361 Laxenburg, Austria 
Tel: +43 2236 807 342 
Fax: +43 2236 71313 
E-mail: publications@iiasa.ac.at 
Web: www.iiasa.ac.at 
 
 
Interim Reports on work of the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis receive only 
limited review. Views or opinions expressed herein do not necessarily represent those of the 
Institute, its National Member Organizations, or other organizations supporting the work. 
Interim Report IR-13-015 
Pollution, Public Health Care, and Life Expectancy When 
Inequality Matters 
Andreas Schaefer (schaefer@wifa.uni-leipzig.de) 
Alexia Prskawetz (afp@econ.tuwien.ac.at) 
 
Approved by 
Wolfgang Lutz (lutz@iiasa.ac.at) 
Leader, World Population Program 
October 16, 2013 
 
 
 ii 
Contents 
1 Introduction ................................................................................................................... 1 
2 The Model ..................................................................................................................... 3 
2.1 Production ............................................................................................................... 4 
2.2 Demographics and Households’ Decisions ............................................................ 4 
2.3 The Government ..................................................................................................... 7 
2.4 The Credit Market .................................................................................................. 7 
3 The Evolution of Wealth ............................................................................................... 8 
4 Policy ........................................................................................................................... 11 
5 Numerical Experiments ............................................................................................... 17 
6 Discussion .................................................................................................................... 23 
7 Summary and Conclusions .......................................................................................... 26 
8 References ................................................................................................................... 28 
9 Mathematical Appendix .............................................................................................. 29 
 
 
 iii 
Abstract 
We analyze the link between economic inequality in terms of wealth, life expectancy, 
health care and pollution. The distribution of wealth is decisive for the number of 
households investing in human capital. Moreover, the willingness to invest in human 
capital depends on agents' life expectancy which determines the length of the 
amortization period of human capital investments. Life expectancy is positively affected 
by public health care expenditures but adversely affected by the pollution stock 
generated by aggregate production. Our model accounts for an endogenous take-off in 
terms of human capital investments. Higher initial inequality delays the take-off because 
a given set of policies (abatement measures and public health care) is less effective in 
improving agents' survival probabilities. We compare a change in taxes to a change in 
expenditure shares on health and abatement given different amounts of (initial) 
inequality. The advantage of the latter as compared to the former is the achieved 
increase in the tax base which induces more expenditures on health care and abatement 
measures, such that an even higher economic activity is compatible with a similar level 
of long-run pollution. 
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1 Introduction
Beginning with the work of John and Pecchenio (1994) and Pecchenino et al. (1995)
several authors have argued that one of the difficulties in the interaction of the en-
vironment and economic activity is the different life span of both systems. While
the lifetime of the environment is infinite, the lifetime of economic agents is finite.
Hence, the incentive to invest into the environment might be limited by the lifetime
of the individuals. Recently a paper by Mariani et al. (2010) has extended this liter-
ature considering the two way interaction between pollution and life expectancy, i.e.
it is assumed that life expectancy and environmental quality are jointly determined.
In an extension to the model by Mariani et al. (2010), Raffin and Seegmuller (2012)
studied the path of pollution and economic growth when households’ longevity is
endogenously determined not only by environmental quality but also by health pol-
icy. While economic growth may induce negative externalities on the environment,
it may also be the engine of growth for investment into health and thereby enhance
life expectancy. As argued in Raffin and Seegmuller (2012) the tax base will be
positively associated with higher economic growth and hence more resources will be
available to finance investments such as health expenditures and abatement mea-
sures. These models allow for multiple steady states, with a low level trap of high
pollution and low life expectancy and a high level equilibrium with low pollution and
high life expectancy. None of these models has so far considered the role of inequal-
ity in the process of economic growth. However, the initial distribution of wealth
in a society may limit the possibilities for economic growth and the effectiveness of
economic policy in terms of public health care and abatement measures.
In this paper, we analyze the link between economic inequality in terms of wealth,
life expectancy, health care and pollution based on the work by Galor and Zeira
(1993). In our framework, life expectancy is positively affected by public health care
expenditures but adversely affected by the pollution stock generated by aggregate
production. Life expectancy plays a key role in our model since it determines the
level of human capital investment and therefore aggregate output. If households
expect to live longer, they are more inclined to invest in human capital as the
returns to human capital will accrue over a longer period and borrowers’ credit costs
shrink. We assume that the government levies taxes on households’ income (where
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we distinguish between skilled and unskilled households) and uses taxes to finance
health care and abatement measures. As earlier stages of economic development are
characterized by low life expectancy, human capital investments are zero. However,
tax financed health care and abatement measures may improve life expectancy such
that agents start to invest in skills once the level of the life expectancy has passed a
certain threshold. Therefore our framework takes account for an endogenous take off
in terms of human capital investment. Higher initial inequality delays the take-off
because a given set of policies reflected by income taxes and expenditure shares on
public health care and abatement measures is less effective.
Moreover, we compare a change in taxes to a change in expenditure shares on
health and abatement given different amounts of (initial) inequality. Our results
show that an increase in the tax rate (hence the government budget) benefits skilled
and unskilled agents in terms of wealth as long as the marginal cost of taxes in terms
of foregone lifetime earnings are smaller than the marginal increase in lifetime net-
earnings generated through the improvement in life expectancies. However, since
the marginal benefit of an increase in tax revenues for the skilled group exceeds
the corresponding level of the marginal benefit of the unskilled population group,
economic policy increases long-run inequality in terms of wealth. An increase in
health expenditures compared to investments in abatement always raises the wealth
of skilled and unskilled, but again the gain is greater for skilled workers. Moreover,
we find that an increase in the expenditure share on public health care increases the
tax base which induces more expenditures on health care and abatement measures,
such that an even higher economic activity is compatible with a similar level of long-
run pollution as compared to the levels resulting from an increase in the income tax.
The initially adverse impact of economic development on individuals’ health is
mirrored in the evolution of life expectancy at birth as shown in Figure 1. Average
life expectancy at birth stagnated during the second phase of the industrial revo-
lution and started to increase only in the last four decades of the 19th century. In
cities, life expectancies at birth started even to decline and reached a level passed
in the 15th century already, although per capita output was already growing. It is
well documented that the gap in mortality rates between cities and rural areas can
be explained by environmental degradation and pollution. In this line of argumen-
tation the significance of water as an industrial raw material has been documented
by Hassan (1985): fresh water was used for commercial purposes while the new
entrepreneurial class saw no point in spending money for sanitation and sewage
treatment plants. In addition, Hainse (2004) and Komlos (1998) provide evidence
for the adverse impacts of economic development during the Industrial Revolution,
in the sense that physical height of soldiers declined during the 19th century in the
U.S. as well as England and the Netherlands indicating an increase in morbidity over
the same period of time. Adverse effects of economic growth on the environment in
earlier stages of economic development are even today of greatest concern, for exam-
ple the combined health and non-health cost of outdoor air and water pollution for
China’s economy comes to around 5.8% of the GDP per year (World Bank, 2007).
Moreover, as regards later stages of economic development, Chay and Greenstone
(2003) provide evidence for the impact of air pollution on infant mortality in the
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Figure 1: Expectation of life at birth (London excluded) (Szreter, 1997).
U.S. during the recession period 1981-82 and conclude that a 1-percent reduction in
total suspended particulates results in a 0.35-percent decline in infant mortality at
the county level.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, we introduce
the model. Section 3 explores the evolution of wealth and Section 4 discusses the
set of economic policies in terms of income taxes and expenditures shares on public
health care and abatement measures. In order to capture the entire evolution of the
economy towards its steady state and in order to illustrate our analytical findings,
we perform numerical experiments in Section 5. In Section 6, we provide a critical
discussion of our results and, finally, Section 7 concludes.
2 The Model
Households live for two periods and decide in their first period whether or not to
invest in skills. The amount of inherited wealth by the parental household deter-
mines whether agents acquire skills since the human capital investment is subject
to indivisibilities and capital market imperfections in the sense that borrowers’ in-
terest rate exceeds lenders’ opportunity costs. Moreover, the willingness to invest
in human capital depends on agents’ life expectancy as it triggers the amortization
period of human capital investments. The long-run performance of the economy
depends on the initial distribution of wealth which determines the number of agents
investing in skills.
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2.1 Production
Consider a small open economy which produces a homogeneous good Yt in two
sectors, an unskilled and a skilled sector denoted by superscripts u, s in the follow-
ing. Output of the unskilled sector, Y ut , is subject to a linear production function
employing unskilled labor, Lut , only
Y ut = aL
u
t , a > 0 (1)
with a denoting a positive scaling factor. The high skilled sector produces Y st subject
to a neoclassical production function of Cobb-Douglas type and employs skilled
labor, Lst , as well as physical capital, Kt, such that
Y st = b(Kt)
γ(Lst)
1−γ , b > 0, γ ∈ (0, 1) (2)
with b denoting a positive scaling factor and γ representing the output elasticity of
capital. Aggregate output is given by
Yt = Y
s
t + Y
u
t . (3)
The small open economy assumption implies an exogenous interest rate that
equals the international interest rate r¯. Markets are assumed to be perfectly com-
petitive. Given r¯ and profit maximizing behavior of firms, the capital intensity, kt,
is determined by:
r¯ = γbkγ−1t − δ, (4)
with kt = Kt/L
s
t , and 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 representing the rate of depreciation of physical
capital. In addition the wage rates for skilled and unskilled labor are given as
wst = (1− γ)bk
γ
t , (5)
wut = a. (6)
Hence, the small-open economy assumption switches off any dynamics with respect
to k and factor prices, such that k, ws and wu are constant for all t, since
kt =
(
γb
r¯ + δ
) 1
1−γ
. (7)
Thus in period t, the level of output in the skilled sector depends only on the amount
of skilled labor and exogenously fixed parameters:
Y st = b (ktL
s
t)
γ (Lst)
1−γ = b
1
1−γ
(
γ
r¯ + δ
) γ
1−γ
Lst . (8)
2.2 Demographics and Households’ Decisions
An individual born in t−1 expects to live for 1+φt periods with 0 ≤ φt ≤ 1 represent-
ing the probability to reach the end of period t (see also Figure 2). Hence the terms
life expectancy and survival probability can be used interchangeably. The probabil-
ity to reach the end of the second period of life is determined by the level of public
health expenditures, Ht, and the exposure to pollutants, Pt, i.e. φt = φ(Ht, Pt).
4
t− 1 t
φt
ujt = φt
{ α¯+ln[(1−τ)yit]︷ ︸︸ ︷
α ln cjt + (1− α) ln x
j
t
}
t t+ 1
φt+1
ujt+1 = φt+1
{ α¯+ln[(1−τ)yit+1]︷ ︸︸ ︷
α ln cjt+1 + (1− α) ln x
j
t+1
}
Figure 2: Demographics
Definition 1 Life expectancy 0 ≤ φt ≤ 1 is a non-decreasing function in public
health care expenditures, Ht, and a non-increasing function in the pollution stock
Pt, such that
∂φ(Ht, Pt)
∂Ht
≥ 0, (9)
∂φ(Ht, Pt)
∂Pt
≤ 0. (10)
Moreover, the cross-derivative is non-positive, i.e.
∂2φ(Ht, Pt)
∂Ht∂Pt
≤ 0. (11)
A non-positive cross-derivative of the life expectancy with respect to H and P
means that an increase in pollution may reduce the effectiveness of public health
expenditures on φ.
At this point it is worth to notice that public health expenditures improve the life
expectancy of those generations which are taxed while an improvement of environ-
mental quality reflected by a decline of the pollution stock in the subsequent period,
Pt+1, benefits only those generations which are at life from t + 1 onwards. More-
over, in Section 2.3, we will see that public health expenditures depend on aggregate
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tax revenues, i.e. aggregate income. Since we abstract from population growth an
increase in aggregate income corresponds to an increase in per capita income and
thus to an improvement in health expenditures and life expectancy. Thus our the-
ory is compatible to the well-known Preston-curve suggesting a positive association
between per capita income and life expectancy.
Note that we only consider public expenditures on health and ignore private
health expenditures. Our approach is similar to Aisa and Pueyo (2006). Different
to Aisa and Pueyo we assume that the level of health expenditures and not the
share of health expenditures in total GDP positively affects life expectancy.1 By
only focusing on public health care we aim to emphasize the role of the allocation
of public expenditures between health care and pollution abatement on economic
growth (see also Agenor and Neanidis 2011). On one hand health expenditures
reduce income through taxes thereby also reducing spending on pollution abatement,
on the other hand higher taxes induce a higher life expectancy and thereby foster
human capital accumulation and economic growth.
Agents, j, work either as unskilled workers, j = u, in both periods or invest in
their first period of life in human capital and become a skilled worker, j = s, in
their second period of life. Fertility is exogenous in the sense that each household
has exactly one descendant which replaces him after she dies. Agents born in t− 1
derive utility out of consumption, cjt , and out of bequests to their offspring, x
j
t , in
their second period of life . Lifetime utility in t of an agent j born in period t − 1
is specified as
ujt = E[u¯
j
t ] = φ
j
t u¯
j
t . (12)
with φjt = φt ∀j and u¯
j
t = α ln c
j
t + (1 − α) ln x
j
t . Hence, we assume the same life
expectancy for skilled and unskilled people.
An agent j born in period t − 1 maximizes lifetime utility (12) subject to lifetime
earnings net of taxes, τ ∈ (0, 1), resulting in
cjt = α(1− τ)y
j
t , (13)
xjt = (1− α)(1− τ)y
j
t , (14)
with yjt denoting agents’ second period’s income depending on life expectancy φt.
Before we specify life time earnings further below, we obtain the indirect utility
function from (12)-(14) as
u¯jt = α¯ + ln[(1− τ)y
j
t ], (15)
with α¯ = α lnα + (1− α) ln[1− α].
1But remember that pollution adversely affects agents’ life expectancy in our framework. More-
over, we will assume further below a logistic functional form of φ(Ht, Pt). Thus our model is not
more optimistic with respect to the effectiveness of public health expenditures on improvements of
φ compared to existing literature.
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2.3 The Government
The government raises income taxes τ ∈ (0, 1) in order to finance public health
expenditures Ht and abatement measures At. In period t the government taxes
unskilled households working in their first period of life, Lut , and skilled and unskilled
households born in t− 1 that survived to period t, i.e. φt(L
u
t−1 + L
s
t−1). Hence tax
revenues in period t are
Gt = τ(φt(y
s
tL
s
t−1 + y
u
t L
u
t−1) + w
uLut ). (16)
Abstracting from intertemporal debts and assuming constant expenditure shares for
public health, ν, and abatement measures, 1− ν, a balanced budget in each period
requires
Ht = νGt, (17)
At = (1− ν)Gt, ν ∈ (0, 1). (18)
In t+ 1, the stock of pollutants, Pt+1, increases by current emissions, Et, generated
by the production process. We assume for simplicity Et = E(Yt) = ε0Yt. On the
other hand, the impact of emissions on the pollution stock can be reduced through
tax financed abatement measures, At. Moreover, the environment regenerates at
rate 0 < η < 1, such that the pollution stock evolves over time according to
Pt+1 = (1− η)Pt + ε0Yt − ε1At, 0 < ε1 < ε0, η ∈ (0, 1), (19)
with ε0 denoting the impact of one unit of output on the pollution stock and ε1
reflecting the productivity of abatement measures.
2.4 The Credit Market
The credit market is subject to imperfections as in Galor and Zeira (1993), in the
sense that borrowers’ interest rate, it, exceeds the world market interest rate, r¯. In
contrast to Galor and Zeira (1993), it depends inversely on agents’ life expectancy,
φt. Moreover, as φt = φ(Ht, Pt), borrowers’ credit costs are not time invariant and
affected by public health expenditures and abatement measures triggering the wedge
between it and r¯. Thus economic policy affects the incentive to invest in skills (by
determining life expectancy), but the effectiveness of economic policy will depend
on the amount of economic inequality. Before we come back to this issue further
below, we elaborate more on the mechanisms on the credit market.
Human capital investments are (see Galor and Zeira, 1993) subject to indivisi-
bilities, in the sense that it requires an amount h > 0 to become a skilled worker.
Workers born in t − 1 with inherited wealth xjt−1 < h can borrow h − x
j
t−1 at the
capital market, but since human capital investments are unobservable and the tran-
sition to the end of the second period of life is uncertain, moral hazard and mortality
risks induce a wedge between the equilibrium interest rate r¯ and the interest rate it
at which lenders are willing to lend money to borrowers. Hence, credits are subject
to monitoring costs z, such that the zero profit condition is given by
(1 + it)φt(h− x
j
t−1) = z + (1 + r¯)(h− x
j
t−1). (20)
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The left hand side denotes the lender’s credit costs, i.e. the interest rate that the
lender faces times the probability to survive to the end of the next period and times
the amount of investment to be borrowed. The right hand side indicates the costs
that accrue to the borrower. These are the monitoring costs, z, plus the value of
the borrowed investment if it would be invested at the international interest rate.
As lenders can still evade repayment by spending βz with β > 1, borrowers
set monitoring effort, z, such that lenders are indifferent between repayment and
evasion
(1 + it)φt(h− x
j
t−1) = βz. (21)
From the last two equations we obtain it
(1 + it)φt(h− x
j
t−1) =
(1 + it)φt(h− x
j
t−1)
β
+ (1 + r¯)(h− xjt−1) (22)
⇒ it =
β
(β − 1)
(1 + r¯)
φt
− 1. (23)
The following proposition summarizes the association between borrower’s and lender’s
interest rates as well as life expectancy.
Proposition 1 Since β > 1 it follows that it > r¯.
2 Moreover, the interest rate for
credits, it, is inversely related to life expectancy, i.e.
∂it
∂φt
< 0, such that higher health
risks increase lenders’ credit costs.
3 The Evolution of Wealth
Lifetime utility (15) of agents born in t depends positively on lifetime earnings yjt+1
which in turn depends on human capital investment. Whether or not to invest
in human capital depends on the level of inherited bequests, i.e. xjt R h, and
life expectancy φt+1, with h representing an exogenous fixed cost of human capital
investment. Households with xjt ≥ h invest in human capital, if lifetime utility
of becoming a skilled worker is at least as high as lifetime utility from remaining
unskilled, i.e. ust+1 ≥ u
u
t+1 which implies in light of (15) that y
s
t+1 ≥ y
u
t+1 , such that
φt+1w
s + (xjt − h)(1 + r¯)︸ ︷︷ ︸
yst+1
≥ φt+1w
u + ((1− τ)wu + xjt)(1 + r¯)︸ ︷︷ ︸
yut+1
.3 (24)
2it > r¯ implies
(1+r¯)β
φt(β−1)
> 1 + r¯ and therefore β(β−1) > φt which is valid as long as β > 1 since
0 < φt ≤ 1.
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In contrast, households with xjt < h wish to invest in human capital, if u
u,s
t+1 ≥ u
u
t+1.
4
These households borrow h − xjt at an interest rate it+1 from the capital market,
such that
(1− τ)yu,st+1 = (1− τ)(w
sφt+1 + (x
j
t − h)(1 + it+1)), with x
j
t < h. (25)
The requirement of uu,st+1 ≥ u
u
t+1 implies again in light of (15) that the last expression
holds with equality, if
yu,st+1 = y
u
t+1. (26)
Condition (26) determines the minimum level of inherited wealth necessary to be-
come a skilled worker, xjt = x
crit
t , conditional on the survival probability φt+1:
xcritt =
1
it+1 − r¯
[
(1− τ)wu(1 + r¯) + h(1 + it+1)− φt+1(w
s − wu)
]
. (27)
Since xjt+1 = (1−α)(1− τ)y
j
t+1 and given that y
s
t+1 ≥ y
u
t+1, wealth of agents born in
t given life expectancy, φt+1, evolves according to:
(1) Agents born in unskilled households with xut < x
crit
t remain unskilled
xut+1 = (1− α)(1− τ)y
u
t+1
= (1− α)(1− τ)[(xut + (1− τ)w
u)(1 + r¯) + wuφt+1], (28)
(2) Agents born in skilled households with xst ≥ h invest in skills
xst+1 = (1− α)(1− τ)y
s
t+1 = (1− α)(1− τ)[w
sφt+1 + (x
s
t − h)(1 + r¯)], (29)
(3) Agents born in unskilled households with h > xut ≥ x
crit
t invest in skills
xu,st+1 = (1− α)(1− τ)y
u,s
t+1 = (1− α)(1− τ)[w
sφt+1 + (x
u
t − h)(1 + it+1)]. (30)
The system (28)-(30) can be presented graphically in the (xt+1, xt)-plane for a given
stock of pollution and public health expenditures, i.e. a given life expectancy φt+1.
Thus, the loci depicted in Figure 3 are conditional on the state of φt+1. conditional
on the state of φt+1. This is the reason why we refer to conditional loci and steady
states. The positions and the slope of these conditional loci and steady states are
important as they trigger the dynamics of the economy to their long-run values
and the composition of the population in terms of skilled and unskilled agents. We
will describe the behavior of the conditional steady states and xcritt in detail further
3The left-hand side of the last expression captures the lifetime income of a skilled household
in her second period of life, i.e. labor income, ws, multiplied by the corresponding level of life
expectancy, φt+1 plus wealth net human capital investment times accrued interests, (x
j
t−h)(1+r).
The right-hand side captures lifetime income of an unskilled household that does not invest in
human capital, i.e. labor income, wu, multiplied by φt+1, plus the sum out of first-period labor
income net of taxes, (1− τ)wu, and wealth, xjt , times accrued interests.
4The superscript u, s denotes agents that are born in unskilled households and decide to invest
in skills.
9
xs∗,φt+1
xjt
hxcritt
xu,s∗,φt+1x
u
∗,φt+1
xjt+1
xut+1
xu,st+1 xst+1
45o
Figure 3: Evolution of wealth conditional on life expectancies φt+1 and taxes τ
below (see also Figure 4). Noting that it+1 is a function of φt+1, the conditional
stationary solutions read as follows
xs∗,φt+1 =
(1− α)(1− τ)(wsφt+1 − h(1 + r¯))
1− (1− α)(1− τ)(1 + r¯)
, (31)
xu∗,φt+1 =
(1− α)(1− τ)wu((1 + r¯)(1− τ) + φt+1)
1− (1− α)(1− τ)(1 + r¯)
, (32)
xu,s∗,φt+1 =
(1− α)(1− τ)(h(1 + it+1)− w
sφt+1)
(1− α)(1− τ)(1 + it+1)− 1
, (33)
with 1 > (1− α)(1− τ)(1 + r¯) and (1− α)(1− τ)(1 + it+1) > 1.
5
The steady state of the economy is determined by the initial distribution of wealth,
Γ0, and the policy set Φ = {τ, ν}. Both in combination determine the long-run
distribution of wealth Γ∗ which in turn is determined by the distribution of the
population between the two stable steady states xu∗,φ∗ and x
s
∗,φ∗
. The following
proposition describes the steady state of our economy.
Proposition 2 The steady state of the economy is characterized by a constant life
5As can be verified easily: φt+1 > (1− α)(1− τ)(1 + r¯) implies that the exterior (conditional)
steady states are stable while (1−α)(1− τ)(1+ it+1) > 1 implies that the interior one is unstable.
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expectancy, φt = φ∗ ≤ 1, which implies a constant interest rate
i∗ =
β(1 + r¯)
(β − 1)φ∗
− 1, (34)
a constant level of wealth for skilled and unskilled households
xs∗,φ∗ = =
(1− α)(1− τ)(wsφ∗ − h(1 + r¯))
1− (1− α)(1− τ)(1 + r¯)
, (35)
xu∗,φ∗ = =
(1− α)(1− τ)wu((1 + r¯)(1− τ) + φ∗)
1− (1− α)(1− τ)(1 + r¯)
, (36)
xu,s∗,φ∗ =
(1− α)(1− τ)(h(1 + i∗)− w
sφ∗)
(1− α)(1− τ)(1 + i∗)− 1
, (37)
with 1 > (1− α)(1− τ)(1 + r¯) and (1− α)(1− τ)(1 + i∗) > 1,
and a constant distribution of households between the two exterior steady states xs∗,φ∗
and xu∗,φ∗, such that L
u
t = L
u
∗ ≥ 0 and L
s
t = L
s
∗ ≥ 0 with L
u
∗ +L
s
∗ = L. Therefore the
level of aggregate production Yt = Y∗ is constant as well and reads
Y∗ = Y
u
∗ + Y
s
∗ = aL
u
∗ + b
1
1−γ
(
γ
r¯ + δ
) γ
1−γ
Ls∗, (38)
such that the level of Pollution, P , tax revenues, G, public health expenditures, H,
and abatement measures, A, are constant as well and given by
P∗ =
ε0Y∗ + ε1(1− ν)τG∗
η
, (39)
G∗ = τ(φ∗(y
s
tL
s
∗ + y
u
t L
u
∗) + w
u
t L
u
∗), (40)
H∗ = νG∗, (41)
A∗ = (1− ν)G∗. (42)
4 Policy
In this section we analyze changes in the policy set Φ = {τ, ν}. Changes in Φ
alter life expectancy and therefore the skill composition of the population given the
initial distribution of wealth Γ0. Thus economic policy has a direct impact on the
evolution of inequality and the long-run performance of an economy. Changes in τ
alter life expectancies, interest rates, disposable incomes of households, and resources
available for abatement measures. In contrast, a change in ν leaves disposable
incomes unaffected.
Before turning to changes in Φ, it will be instructive to analyze the effects of
changes in life expectancies, φ, on the (conditional) steady states and xcritt . We thus
analyze the dynamics of the conditional steady states (i.e. the shift of the respective
intercepts with the 45o-line in Figure 3), in response to the transition of φ towards its
long-run value φ∗ ≤ 1. As we will see, the increase in φ gives rise to an endogenous
take off in terms of human capital investments. This take-off is essentially triggered
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by the dynamics of the conditional stable steady states, xu∗,φt+1, and x
s
∗,φt+1
, while
the dynamics of the wealth distribution and the composition of the population in
terms of skilled and unskilled households is affected by xcritt and x
u,s
∗,φt+1
.6 The an-
alytical results are summarized in Proposition 3 and 4. The following proposition
summarizes the dependence of xu∗,φt+1 and x
s
∗,φt+1
in response to a change in φ.
Proposition 3 (Exterior steady states, changes in φ) (i) An increase in longevity
increases the (conditional) long-run levels of wealth for skilled and unskilled
households, i.e.
∂xu
∗,φt+1
∂φt+1
≥ 0 and
∂xs
∗,φt+1
∂φt+1
≥ 0 for φt+1 ∈ (0, φ∗), and φ∗ ≤ 1,
where
∂xu∗,φt+1
∂φt+1
=
(1− α)(1− τ)wu
1− (1− α)(1− τ)(1 + r¯)
≥ 0 (43)
∂xs∗,φt+1
∂φt+1
=
(1− α)(1− τ)ws
1− (1− α)(1− τ)(1 + r¯)
≥ 0, (44)
with equality, if φt+1 = 1. Moreover,
∂xu
∗,φt+1
∂φt+1
<
∂xs
∗,φt+1
∂φt+1
since wu < ws.
(ii) As life expectancy approaches zero, the (conditional) stable steady states of
both population groups reach a minimum value
xs∗,min = −
(1− τ)(1− α)(1 + r¯)h
1− (1− α)(1− τ)(1 + r¯)
< 0 (45)
xu∗,min =
(1− τ)2(1 + r¯)(1− α)wu
1− (1− α)(1− τ)(1 + r¯)
> 0. (46)
(iii) Given that φ∗ is such that x
s
∗,φ∗
> xu∗,φ∗, it follows from (i) and (ii) that there
exists a critical φc < φ∗ implying that x
s
∗,φc = h, such that agents with x
j
t ≥ h
start to invest in skills for φ ≥ φc.7
In Figure 4, we depict the conditional steady states xu∗,φt+1 and x
s
∗,φt+1
as linear
functions of φ starting at xu∗,min > 0 and x
s
∗,min < 0, respectively. In light of
item (i), both population groups benefit from increasing life expectancies, but the
marginal effect is stronger for the skilled population group as ws > wu. Moreover,
life expectancy must exceed a threshold φc in order to make investments in human
capital profitable, in the sense that life expectancies above φc (items (ii) and (iii))
assure that lifetime utility of a skilled agent exceeds lifetime utility of remaining
unskilled given that the amount of inherited wealth xjt is at least h . The threshold φ
c
implies that the (conditional) steady state level of wealth for the skilled population
group is as least as high as h. Since life expectancy is endogenous, our model is
therefore able to generate an endogenous take-off in terms human capital investment.
6Remember that xcritt determines the necessary amount of wealth to become a skilled worker
for a given life expectancy while xu,s
∗,φt+1
determines the basin of attraction of the superior steady
state for a given life expectancy.
7Note that xu
∗,φ˜
= xs
∗,φ˜
implies wsφ˜−(1+ r¯)h = (1−τ)(1+ r¯)wu+ φ˜wu. This threshold however
is irrelevant, since h > xs
∗
.
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Figure 4: The (conditional) steady states and xcritt as a function of life expectancy
φ.
The next feature of our framework is the dynamics of the wealth distribution as
influenced by the evolution of life expectancies over time. For the long-run compo-
sition of the population in terms of skilled and unskilled households, the location of
the minimum amount of wealth necessary to invest in skills, xcritt , and the location
of the unstable interior (conditional) steady state, xu,s∗,φt+1 , are crucial. More pre-
cisely, the distance between xcritt and x
u,s
∗,φt+1
is crucial for the long run distribution
of the population. Though a decline in xcritt facilitates more unskilled households to
invest in skills, it is the location of xu,s∗,φt+1 that demarcates the basin of attraction
of the two exterior steady states. Hence a reduction in xcritt given a distribution
of wealth Γt is beneficial for unskilled households during the transition, but not
necessarily in the long-run as long as the decline in xcritt is not accompanied by a
decline in xu,s∗,φt+1 which assures that more unskilled dynasties transit towards the
superior steady state. The following proposition shows the sensitivity of the interior
(conditional) steady state and the minimum level of wealth necessary to invest in
skills when life expectancy changes.
Proposition 4 (Interior steady state, xu,s∗,φt+1, x
crit
t , and changes in φt+1) The
minimum level of wealth, xcritt , necessary to become a skilled worker for agents with
wealth xjt < h and the interior unstable conditional steady state x
u,s
∗,φt+1
are hump-
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shaped in φt+1, whereby it holds that x
u,s
∗,φt+1
> xcritt if 0 < φt < φ˜, where φ = φ˜ implies
xcritt = x
u,s
∗,φt+1
. Moreover, xcritt and x
u,s
∗,φt+1
are declining in φ for φc ≤ φt+1 ≤ φ∗.
(Proof, see Appendix)
In light of Proposition 4, see also Figure 4, it follows that an increase in life ex-
pectancy lowers the minimum level of wealth necessary to become a skilled worker,
xcritt , and the unstable interior (conditional) steady state, x
u,s
∗,φt+1
, in the relevant
interval φ ∈ (φc, φ∗). Since, x
crit
t = x
u,s
∗,φt+1
, if φt = φ˜, the distance between x
crit
t
and xu,s∗,φt+1 declines with increasing life expectancy. Thus, the improvement in life
expectancy is beneficial for descendants of unskilled households that wish to invest
in skills. With the induced decline of xu,s∗,φt+1 the demarcation line of the two basins
of attraction shrinks as well, such that more descendants of unskilled households
that invested in skills may transit towards the superior long-run equilibrium xs∗,φ∗
which would have converged otherwise towards the inferior equilibrium xu∗,φ∗ . How
sizable this effect is depends on the distribution of wealth, Γt, in the sense that a
more equal distribution of wealth locates more unskilled households in the vicinity
of xu,s∗,φt+1 , such that more unskilled households investing in skills benefit from the
improvement in φ and transit towards xs∗,φ∗ . In other words, the effect of improving
health conditions on the long-run performance of the economy depends on Γt. Like-
wise, we will see that the effectiveness of economic policy in terms of Φ depends on
Γt.
We next study the reaction of the (conditional) steady states in response to a
change in the policy set Φ = {τ, ν}. The following proposition summarizes the sen-
sitivity of the two exterior stable (conditional) steady states in response to change
in the tax rate τ :
Proposition 5 (Effects of τ on xs∗,φt+1 and x
u
∗,φt+1
) (i) The (conditional) steady
state of the skilled population group increases in response to an increase in τ ,
if
(1− τ)ws
∂φt+1
∂τ
>
ws − h(1 + r¯)
1− (1− τ)(1− α)(1 + r¯)
=
xs∗,φt+1
(1− α)(1− τ)
= ys∗,φt+1 . (47)
(ii) The (conditional) steady state of the unskilled population group increases in
response to an increase in τ , if
(1− τ)
(∂φt+1
∂τ
− (1 + r¯)
)
wu
>
[(1 + r¯)(1− τ) + φ]wu
1− (1− τ)(1− α)(1 + r¯)
=
xu∗,φt+1
(1− α)(1− τ)
= yu∗,φt+1 . (48)
Proposition 5 states that an increase in τ benefits skilled and unskilled agents in
terms of wealth as long as the marginal cost of taxes in terms of forgone lifetimes
earnings (right-hand side of the equations) are smaller than the marginal increase in
lifetime net-earnings generated through the improvement in life expectancy, ∂φt+1
∂τ
>
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0 (left-hand side of the equations). Furthermore, the marginal benefit of the skilled
population group exceeds the marginal benefit of the unskilled population group, as
ws
wu
>
∂φt+1
∂τ
− (1 + r¯)
∂φt+1
∂τ
, (49)
since ws > wu and
∂φt+1
∂τ
−(1+r¯)
∂φt+1
∂τ
< 1. Moreover, the marginal benefit of the unskilled
population group may even turn negative, if ∂φt+1
∂τ
< (1+ r¯). Interestingly, economic
policy increases long-run inequality in terms of wealth through its asymmetric im-
pact on the long-run levels of wealth for skilled and the unskilled population group.
However, this effect is at least partially compensated by a reduction in xcritt and
xu,s∗,φt+1 in response to an increase in taxes
Proposition 6 (Effects of τ on xu,s∗,φt+1 and x
crit
t ) (i) The interior steady state
declines in response to an increase in τ , i.e.
∂x
u,s
∗,φt+1
∂τ
< 0, if
[h(1 + it+1)− w
sφt+1] + (1− τ)
∂φt+1
∂τ
[
ws − h
∂(1 + it+1)
∂φt+1
]
< (1− τ)
∂φt+1
∂τ
ws
[
(1− α)(1− τ)[(1 + it+1)−
∂(1 + it+1)
∂φt+1
φt+1]
]
(50)
with ∂(1+it+1)
∂φt+1
< 0, and h(1 + it+1)− w
sφt+1, (1− α)(1− τ)(1 + it+1)− 1 > 0.
(ii) The minimum level of wealth necessary to invest in skills declines in response
to an increase in taxes, since
∂xcritt
∂τ
=
[
− wu(1 + r¯) + h
∂(1 + i)
∂φt
∂φt
∂τ
−
∂φt
∂τ
(ws − wu)
]
−
1
i− r¯
[
(1− τ)wu(1 + r¯) + h(1 + i)− φt(w
s − wu)
]
< 0, (51)
since the first term in squared brackets is negative while the second term in
squared brackets equals xcritt which is positive.
According to item (i) of Proposition 6, the change of xu,s∗,φt+1 in response to an
increase in τ is ambiguous: Because of (33), an improvement in life expectancy
financed by an increase in τ has an ambiguous effect on xu,s∗,φt through the decline in
it+1. On the one hand, it increases second period income w
sφt − h(1 + i) (reduces
debts), but diminishes the return on wealth. If condition (50) is met, the latter effect
is lower than the former. Item (ii), in turn, states that xcritt is negatively associated
to an increase in taxes. Both results in combination affect the dynamics of the
wealth distribution. Given a favorable distribution of wealth, Γt, it is possible that
the reduction in xcritt and x
u,s
∗,φt+1
affects all unskilled households, such that the long-
run composition of households exhibits only skilled dynasties. Then, the induced
asymmetric impact of τ on the exterior steady states doesn’t play any role. The
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adverse impact on the inferior steady state gains in importance, however, the larger
the initial amount of inequality is. Furthermore, we can not exclude the case that
a decline in xcritt is accompanied by an increase in x
u,s
∗,φt+1
, such that in an extreme
case dynasties would start to invest in skills initially, but their descendants would
cease to acquire human capital since the basin of attraction of the inferior steady
state is at least temporarily larger.
We now turn our attention to the effects of a change in the public expenditure
share for health care services, ν, given τ on the (conditional) steady states and on
xcritt .
Proposition 7 (Effects of ν on xs∗,φt+1 and x
u
∗,φt+1
) The steady states of the skilled
and the unskilled population group increase in response to an increase in ν
∂xs∗,φt+1
∂ν
=
(1− τ)(1− α)ws
1− (1− τ)(1 + r¯)(1− α)
∂φ
∂ν
> 0 (52)
∂xu∗,φt+1
∂ν
=
(1− τ)(1− α)wu
1− (1− τ)(1 + r¯)(1− α)
∂φ
∂ν
> 0, (53)
such that
∂xs
∗,φt+1
∂ν
>
∂xu
∗,φt+1
∂ν
since ws > wu and given φt+1 < 1.
In light of the last proposition it becomes apparent that an increasing health
expenditure share benefits both population groups while an increase in τ could ben-
efit the skilled but harm the unskilled. Nevertheless, the skilled population group
again benefits more in terms of long-run wealth, such that even this policy change
increases inequality in the long-run. But again, the long-run distribution of the
population over the two exterior steady states is influenced by the dynamics of the
conditional interior steady state, xu,s∗,φt+1 , and x
crit
t . The reaction of x
u,s
∗,φt+1
and xcritt
is summarized in the following proposition.8
Proposition 8 (Effects of ν on xu,s∗,φt+1 and x
crit
t ) (i) The interior steady state
declines in response to an increase in ν, if
ws − h
∂(1 + it+1)
∂φt+1
< (1− α)(1− τ)
(
(1 + it+1)−
∂(1 + it+1)
∂φt+1
φt+1
)
ws
since ∂(1+it+1)
∂φt+1
< 0 and ∂φt+1
∂ν
≥ 0.9
(ii) The minimum level of wealth necessary to invest in skills declines in response
to an increase in taxes, as
∂xcritt
∂ν
=
[
h
∂(1 + it+1)
∂φt+1
∂φt+1
∂ν
−
∂φt+1
∂ν
(ws − wu)
]
−
1
it+1 − r¯
[
(1− τ)wu(1 + r¯) + h(1 + it+1)− φt+1(w
s − wu)
]
< 0,(54)
since the first term in squared brackets is negative while the second term in
squared brackets equals xcritt which is positive.
8The qualitative results are similar to Proposition 6.
9See the explanation following Proposition 6.
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5 Numerical Experiments
In this section, we explore the dynamics of our economy numerically. The set of
parameters is presented in Table 1. The capital income share, γ, is set to 0.3.
Since one period encompasses approximately 30 years, we set the rate of capital
depreciation, δ, equal to 1. r¯ = 4 implies an annual interest rate of 4.7%. The
weight of consumption in the utility function, α, is 0.85. The parameter β = 1.6
implies a borrowers’ interest rate of 9% p.a., if φt = 1. As far as the evolution of
the pollution stock is concerned, there are obviously several degrees of freedom. We
therefore fix η = 0.95 which seems to be plausible over 30 years. The remaining
parameters are fixed in combination with the survival function, φt, (see Eq. (55)) in
an iterative way assuring that life expectancy starts around 0.5 and the transition
to the steady state is completed after 8 periods, i.e. 240 years.
Table 1: Parameters
Technology γ = 0.3; δ = 1; a = 0.2; b=8
Pollution η = 0.95; ε0 = 0.1 ; ε1 = 0.048;
Human capital β = 1.6; h = 0.515; r¯ = 4
Preferences α = 0.85
Φ = {τ, ν} τ = 0.1; ν = 0.8
We assume that life expectancy follows a logistic function in health expenditures
and pollution
φt =
F + A ∗ 0.0001
0.0001 + exp(−k ∗ (ψHHt − ψPPt)) ∗ (A/F − 1)
, (55)
with F = 0.5; k = 10;A = 200;ψH = 0.0038;ψP = 0.0005.
In performing the numerical experiments, we generate an artificial sample of house-
holds (N = 1000) and draw the initial level of wealth xj0, j ∈ N out of a log-normal
distribution F0 ∼ (µx; σx). Since our experiments will deal with different amounts
of initial inequality, we increase the variance of initial wealth, but keep the mean
of the distribution constant and assure therefore the comparability between the
experiments.
Our first experiment deals with different amounts of initial inequality in terms
of wealth. The evolution of the wealth distribution over time is depicted in Figure
5: the left-hand panel shows the kernel density estimation for the first periods for
different amounts of initial inequality and the right-hand panel depicts the overall
transition of the wealth distribution. Since the population converges either to xs∗,φ∗
or xu∗,φ∗ , the wealth distribution collapses into two spikes located at x
u
∗,φ∗
and xs∗,φ∗ ,
with the height of the two spikes representing the amount of inequality.
In Figure 6, we present the dynamics of the conditional steady states xu∗,φt+1 , x
u,s
∗,φt+1
,
xs∗,φt+1 towards their respective stationary values indicated by subscript φ∗, and the
critical level of wealth necessary to invest in skills, xcritt . The baseline scenario with
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Figure 5: Evolution of the wealth distribution (kernel density estimation) - left-hand
panel: first five periods (dashed: increased inequality (mean preserving spread);
solid: baseline scenario) - right-hand panel: complete transition of the baseline
scenario
low initial inequality is depicted in solid lines and the scenario characterized by
higher initial inequality is illustrated by dashed lines. As regards the response of
the conditional steady states and xcritt to improvements in life expectancy, Figure 6
reflects the insights of Figure 4. Figure 7 shows the dynamics of aggregate output,
Y , tax revenues, G, pollution, P , life expectancy, φ, the number of skilled and un-
skilled households, nj, j = s, u, and the number of unskilled households investing in
skills, nu,s. The baseline scenario is again depicted in solid lines while dashed lines
represent the scenario characterized by higher initial inequality.
During the initial stages of economic development, production is low which im-
plies low levels of pollution. Tax revenues are low as well allowing only for low levels
of public health care expenditures and hence low levels of life expectancy. There are
no incentives to invest in skills, since a low value of the life expectancy, φ, implies
high interest rates of borrowers and a short amortization period of human capital in-
vestment. These dynamics are reflected by the fact that the conditional steady state
of the unskilled, xu∗,φt , exceeds the conditional steady state that results from skill
investments, i.e. xs∗,φt (see Figure 6). Therefore, the entire population is composed
of unskilled households, i.e. nu = N . Since wealth evolves according to (28), the tax
base of the government will however increase over time allowing for an increase in
health expenditures and consequently an increase in life expectancy. Although the
increase in life expectancy is ineffective with respect to human capital investment,
as long as φ < φc, it is effective insofar as an increase in φ increases labor supply,
and therefore the level of aggregate production. Moreover, higher life expectancy
increases the second period income of unskilled households, i.e. lifetime earnings
and therefore the accumulation of wealth. Both factors in combination increase tax
revenues and life expectancy even further. In the simulation with low inequality, the
threshold level of φ = φc is reached in period t = 5. From period five onwards, the
conditional steady state of unskilled households falls below the conditional steady
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Figure 6: Dynamics of the conditional steady states and xcritt with different amounts
of initial inequality. High inequality = dashed lines; low inequality = solid lines.
state of skilled households (xu∗,φt+1 < x
s
∗,φt+1
), inducing households with xjt > x
crit
t to
invest in skills. Since further increases in φ reduce borrowers’ interest rate it+1, and
thereby xcritt and x
u,s
∗,φt
, more and more unskilled households are not only willing to
invest in skills but are also attracted by the superior steady state in the long-run.10
The endogenous switch to human capital accumulation increases the level of output
since a more productive technology is used. As we assume a symmetric impact of
the skilled and the unskilled sector on the environment, the pollution stock increases
as a consequence of an increased level of aggregate production.11
An increase in initial inequality has no impact on the long-run values of wealth
per household xu∗φ∗ , x
u,s
∗,φ∗
and xs∗,φ∗ given that φ∗ = 1.
12 Nevertheless a higher amount
of initial inequality reduces the tax base since agents accumulate wealth at a slower
pace. Consequently, life expectancy rises more slowly as compared to the low-
inequality scenario. Accordingly, since lifetime earnings are lower, the levels of the
10Remember the reduction in xcritt and x
u,s
∗,φt
reduces the basin of attraction of the inferior steady
state.
11Note that the model is also able to account for an Environmental Kusnetz Curve, if we would
assume an asymmetric impact of both sectors on the environment in the sense that the s−sector
would harm the environment less as compared to the u-sector. In this case, the evolution of the
pollution stock would read as Pt+1 = (1− η)Pt + ε
u
0Y
u
t + ε
sY st − ε1At with ε
u
0 > ε
s
0.
12Off course an extreme case of initial inequality could result in a long-run value of φ∗ below 1
such that the long-run values of x would be reduced as well.
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Figure 7: Dynamics of aggregate Output, Y , tax revenues, G, pollution stock, P ,
life expectancy, φ, the number of skilled and unskilled households nj, j = u, s and
the number of unskilled households investing in skills, nu,s, with different amounts
of initial inequality. High inequality = dashed lines; low inequality = solid lines.
conditional exterior steady states are reduced as well (see Figure 6). Consequently,
the threshold level φc is only reached in period t = 7 and the take-off in terms of
human capital accumulation is delayed by two periods. Since the transition of life
expectancy is delayed due to a higher initial inequality, the levels of xu,s∗φt+1 and x
crit
t
are also higher during the transition.13 The latter has far reaching consequences for
the long-run performance of the economy. Although the conditional steady states
and xcritt as well as the the level of life expectancy converge to the same long-run
values, the transitory higher value of xcritt hinders more unskilled households to invest
in human capital while more unskilled households that invested in human capital
are still in the basin of attraction of the inferior steady state caused by the increase
in xu,s∗,φt+1 . Therefore, the economy exhibits a lower number of skilled households as
compared to the low-inequality scenario. Summing up, a larger amount of initial
13This effect stems from lower life expectancies and higher interest rates.
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Figure 8: Dynamics of the conditional steady states, xcritt , life expectancy, φ, the
pollution stock, P , and the number of skilled households, ns, with different tax rates
(τ = 0.15: dashed lines; τ = 0.1: solid lines).
inequality reduces the tax base and therefore the effectiveness of the policy set on
life expectancy φ, for any exogenously fixed level of Φ and initial level of pollution.
The lower production level (due to less skilled workers) reduces the pollution level.
Having explored the effects of different degrees of initial inequality on the long-
run performance of the economy, as reflected by the level of aggregate output and
pollution, we turn our focus now to changes in in the policy set Φ. We start with a
change in the income tax rate τ and compare the results (as presented in Figure 8) to
the baseline scenario. Thereafter, we analyze the impact of higher initial inequality
in the high-tax regime with the low-tax regime (see Figure 9). Finally, we conduct
the same experiments with different shares of public health care, i.e. ν.
In Figure 8, the high-tax scenario is depicted by dashed lines while the low-tax
scenario is presented by solid lines. Higher taxes increase expenditures for public
health care and abatement measures. Therefore life expectancy φ increases faster as
compared to the reference scenario. Accordingly the critical level of life expectancy,
φc, is reached already in period t = 2. From now on the conditional steady state that
applies for households that wish to acquire human capital is above the conditional
steady state of the unskilled population group. During the transition, the conditional
steady states of the high-tax regime are above the ones of the low-tax regime. This
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fact is owed to the fast increase in life expectancy which compensates households
for the lower post-tax income at a given level of life expectancy. In later stages
of economic development, the effect of reduced post-tax incomes overcompensates
further gains in life expectancy such that the long-run levels of wealth for both
population groups are reduced compared to the reference scenario with lower taxes.
Unskilled households with a relatively high level of inherited wealth may benefit from
a faster increase in life expectancy inasmuch as the critical level of wealth necessary
to acquire skills and the interior conditional steady state not only declines faster but
converges also to a lower long-run steady state. Thus the basin of attraction of the
superior exterior steady state extends. Accordingly, the favorable evolution of life
expectancy increases the number of skilled households, thereby aggregate production
and pollution compared to the reference scenario.
Nevertheless it is worth to notice that there may be a draw back of a higher tax
rate depending on the initial distribution of wealth. As we have shown, the favorable
evolution of life expectancy induces a fast decline in xcritt and x
u,s
∗,φt+1
. This increases
human capital investments and enhances the possibility of households with a level of
wealth below h to transit in the long-run towards the superior steady state. However,
this possibility depends on the initial amount of inequality. Given a more unfavor-
able initial distribution of wealth, the fast decline in xu,st may block the transition of
unskilled households that acquired human capital towards the superior equilibrium,
such that the number of skilled households shrinks. This effect is shown in Figure
9. There, we consider two regimes that are characterized by high initial inequality
but different tax rates. The high-tax regime is again depicted in dashed lines while
the low-tax regime is presented in solid lines. Apparently, higher inequality reduces
the favorable impact of higher taxes on human capital investments, but reduces the
level of pollution.
In our next experiment we analyze a change in the expenditure share for public
health care, ν, see Figure 10. Contrary to a change in τ , a change in ν leaves (c.p.)
disposable incomes of households unaffected. The long-run values of wealth for
different population groups remain unaffected given that φ∗ = 1. Like an increase in
τ , an increase in ν induces a faster increase in life expectancy which favors human
capital investments.14 Since, the long-run values of wealth are unaffected by a
change in ν, and the number of skilled households has increased, the economy’s tax
base will increase compared to the base line scenario. That is, although economic
activity and its adverse impact on the environment have increased, there are also
more resources available for abatement measures due to an increase in the tax base.
Therefore, the level of pollution is similar compared to the one resulting from an
increase in taxes although the number of skilled households and hence the level of
economic activity has increased even further (compare Fig. 10 and Fig. 8).
14Like in Figure 8, the increase in ν induces also a fast decline in xcritt and x
u,s
φt,∗
such that the
benefit of an increased ν depends also in this case on the initial distribution of wealth.
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Figure 9: Dynamics of the number of skilled households, ns, and the pollution stock,
P with different tax rates (τ = 0.15: dashed lines; τ = 0.1: solid lines) and higher
initial inequality.
6 Discussion
By only focusing on public health care we aim to emphasize the role of the allocation
of public expenditures between health care and pollution abatement on economic
growth (see also Agenor and Neanidis 2011). On one hand health expenditures
reduce income through taxes thereby also reducing spending on pollution abatement,
on the other hand higher taxes allow for an increase in health expenditures thereby
inducing a higher life expectancy and fostering human capital accumulation and
economic growth.
Our analysis is valid for a given policy set, Φ, but we refrain from modeling
explicitly the political process which may explain this policy set. That is, we analyze
for a given policy set, the interplay between economic inequality, human capital
investment and life expectancy while the latter is, in turn, influenced by the specific
policy set, Φ, while the effectiveness of Φ depends on the amount of inequality.
Nevertheless our framework opens an avenue for future research which takes account
for the endogenous determination of Φ. Obviously, the determination of Φ requires
a two-stage optimization with respect to ν and τ .
Assume that the government sets the tax rate given an optimal division of ex-
penditures between health and abatement policy, ν. Then the government would
seek to maximize the utility of a representative agent, j, for example the median
voter, which could be either a skilled agent, an unskilled agent or a descendant of
an unskilled household that invests in skills. Thus, the government would maximize
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Figure 10: Dynamics of the conditional steady states, xcritt , life expectancy, φ, the
pollution stock, P , and the number of skilled households, with different expenditures
shares ν for public health cares (ν = 0.85: dashed lines; ν = 0.8: solid lines).
agent j’s lifetime utility (15)
max
0≤τ≤1
{
φt
[
α¯ + ln[(1− τ)yjt ]
]}
. (56)
The associated first-order condition reads
∂φt
∂τ
[
α¯ + ln[(1− τ)yjt ]
]
+
φt
(1− τ)yjt
[
− yjt + (1− τ)
∂yjt
∂φt
∂φt
∂τ
]
= 0. (57)
The term −yjt in large squared brackets on the left hand side captures the marginal
cost of taxes while the first term on the left hand side and (1 − τ)
∂y
j
t
∂φt
∂φt
∂τ
capture
the marginal benefit of an increase in taxes due to the associated increase in the
survival probability. Obviously, the marginal benefit of raising taxes is zero, if φt = 1
and/or ∂φt
∂τ
= 0, such that the first-order condition reduces to − φt
(1−τ)
.15 As has been
discussed already, an income tax is welfare improving as long as the benefits that
result from an increase in life expectancy and the associated increase in lifetime
earnings over compensate the income loss. Thus, the preferred tax rate depends on
the sensitivity (curvature) of the survival function in response to changes in P and
15Note that φt = 1 implies
∂φt
∂τ
= 0 but ∂φt
∂τ
= 0 may also result for φt < 1.
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H and the income level of the representative agent. In addition it seems reasonable
that wealthier agents are less exposed to pollutants as compared to poorer agents.
Thus the marginal benefit of wealthier agents may be lower which explains that the
new entrepreneurial class saw no point in paying taxes for sanitation in cities. We
come back to this point further below in this section.
As the life expectancy, φt, is increasing in aggregate health expenditures Ht, the
welfare maximizing expenditure share would be ν = 1. This result can be explained
by the fact that the current pollution stock can not be reduced by current abatement
measures, At = (1 − ν)Gt, and that the generation born in t − 1 behaves entirely
selfish in the sense that their impact on the future pollution stock is not internalized
by their lifetime utility function. Thus non-altruistic agents would opt for zero
abatement measures. This result would change, if we assume at least imperfect
altruism with respect to the future stock of pollution. An illustrative example may
be represented by the following utility function:
ujt = φt
[
α¯ + ln[(1− τ)yjt ]
]
− π ln[Pt+1], (58)
where π reflects the weight of environmental damages for the future generation
captured by the pollution stock in the subsequent period. The first-order condition
thus reads
∂φt
∂ν
[
α¯ + ln[(1− τ)yjt ]
]
+
φt
(1− τ)yjt
[
(1− τ)
∂yjt
∂ν
∂φt
∂ν
]
−
π
Pt+1
∂Pt+1
∂ν
= 0. (59)
In light of the last expression it becomes apparent that although φt is an increasing
function in ν it is not necessarily welfare maximizing to set ν = 1 given that the
marginal benefit from abatement weighted by π is sufficiently high.
As we just clarified, we may expect that the marginal benefit of taxation for
wealthier agents is low or even zero, a phenomenon which is very much in line with
historical observations. The significance of water as an industrial raw material has
been documented by Hassan (1985): fresh water was used for commercial purposes
while the new entrepreneurial class saw no point in spending money for sanitation
and sewage treatment plants. This finding points directly at the role of economic in-
equality especially as wealthier households moved to cleaner areas with significantly
lower exposures to local pollutants. In this line of argumentation Szreter (1997)
stresses
... there is indeed something intrinsically dangerous and socially
destabilizing in the wake of economic growth... .
He underlines his statement by the following two observations: (1) local authorities
ere failing the management of their environments, and, as regards the role of in-
equality, (2) as a consequence of it wealthier citizens moved to the periphery of the
cities.
Our setting does not include spatial segregation and differential exposures to
pollutants. Nevertheless it opens an avenue to analyze the emerging social conflict
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between wealthier citizens living in cleaner areas and the majority of people living in
overcrowded and polluted cities. This can be achieved by regionally differing survival
functions capturing the local impact of pollutants on citizen’s survival probability
(see Schaefer 2013).
7 Summary and Conclusions
Based on the work by Galor and Zeira (1993), we analyzed the link between eco-
nomic inequality in terms of wealth, life expectancy and pollution. The distribution
of wealth is decisive for the number of households investing in human capital. More-
over, the willingness to invest in human capital is affected by agents’ life expectancy
since it triggers the length of the amortization period of human capital investments.
In our framework, life expectancy is endogenous and positively affected by public
health care expenditures but adversely affected by the pollution stock stemming
from aggregate production.
Due to a low level of health expenditures owed to a low level of tax revenues,
life expectancies are low in earlier stages of economic development such that there
is no incentive to invest in human capital. Nevertheless, increasing accumulation
of wealth increases step by step the tax base and agents’ life expectancy. After a
threshold level of life expectancy has been passed, households begin to acquire skills.
Our model is therefore able to take account for an endogenous taker-off in terms of
human capital accumulation.
Higher initial inequality retards the take-off, since the tax base of the economy
is reduced which implies lower expenditures on public health care and abatement
measures. Consequently, the increase in life expectancy is slower. The latter in turn
reduces human capital investments, such that the economy is characterized by a
lower aggregate long-run level of production and pollution. In other words, higher
inequality reduces the effectiveness of a given set of economic policies in terms of
health and abatement expenditures.
An increase in taxes or the expenditure share for public health care increases
life expectancy. The more favorable evolution of the life expectancy is beneficial
for human capital investment given that the initial distribution of wealth is not too
unequal. An increase in taxes, given a higher amount of initial inequality, may be
harmful in the sense that less descendants of unskilled households invest in skills.
In general, an increase in taxes reduces long-run wealth of households. Contrary to
an increase in taxes, an increase in the public health expenditure share leaves (c.p.)
disposable incomes of agents constant, such that the long-run levels of wealth per
household remain unaffected or even increase. Since the more favorable evolution
of life expectancy increases the tax base, higher health care expenditure shares in-
crease in general (like an increase in the tax rate) the number of skilled households
and the level of aggregate production in the long-run. The advantage compared to
an increase in taxes however is the achieved increase in the tax base which induces
more expenditures on health care and abatement measures, such that an even higher
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economic activity is compatible with a similar level of long-run pollution.
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9 Mathematical Appendix
Proof of Proposition 4
We first show that xu,sφt,∗ is hump-shaped. In the second step, we demonstrate that
xcritt is hump-shaped as well and always below x
u,s
φt,∗
.
(1) Since limφt→0 xφt,∗ = h and x
s
φt,∗
= xu,sφt,∗ = h, if φt = φ
c = h
(1−α)(1−τ)ws
it
follows that xu,sφt,∗ is non-monotonous is φt. As moreover
lim
φt→0
∂xu,sφt,∗
∂φt
=
(β − 1)h
β(1− α)(1− τ)(1 + r¯)
> 0, (60)
it follows outright that xu,sφt,∗ is hump-shaped.
(2) Since limφt→0 x
crit
t = h and
lim
φt→0
∂xcritt
∂φt
=
β − 1
β
((1− τ)wu + h) > 0, (61)
it follows that xcritt = x
u,s
φt,∗
= h as φt approaches zero and that x
crit
t has a
initially a positive slope as well. Moreover, xcritt has a unique intercept with
xu,sφt,∗ and x
u
φt,∗
, such that xcritt = x
u,s
φt,∗
= xuφt,∗, if φt = φ˜. Since x
u,s
φt,∗
cuts xsφt,∗
from above at φc while xuφt,∗ is strictly below x
s
φt,∗
for φt > φ
c, it follows that
φ˜ > φc. Since the intercept between xcritt and x
u,s
φt,∗
is unique it follows that
xcritt is hump-shaped in φt as well and always below x
u,s
φt,∗
for φt < φ˜.
(3) From (1) and (2) it follows immediately that xcritt and x
u,s
φt,∗
are declining in φt
for φc ≤ φt ≤ φ∗.
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